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Common knowledge is a necessary condition for safe group coordination. When common knowl-
edge can not be obtained, humans routinely use their ability to attribute beliefs and intentions in
order to infer what is known. But such shared knowledge attributions are limited in depth and
therefore prone to coordination failures, because any finite-order knowledge attribution allows for
an even higher order attribution that may change what is known by whom. In three separate ex-
periments we investigate to which degree human participants (N=802) are able to recognize the
difference between common knowledge and nth-order shared knowledge. We use a new two-person
coordination game with imperfect information that is able to cast the recursive game structure and
higher-order uncertainties into a simple, everyday-like setting. Our results show that participants
have a very hard time accepting the fact that common knowledge is not reducible to shared knowl-
edge. Instead, participants try to coordinate even at the shallowest depths of shared knowledge and
in spite of huge payoff penalties.
Introduction
Successful group coordination requires complementary
choices among group members, which, in turn, requires
communication of beliefs and intentions in such a way
that they become common knowledge [1]. A fact is said
to be common knowledge if everyone knows it, and ev-
eryone knows everyone knows it, and everyone knows ev-
eryone knows everyone knows it, and so on, ad infinitum
[2–5]. If the premise of “everyone knows” is not infinitely
nested, but only nested to finite depth, we instead have
shared knowledge. If there is no nested knowledge about
knowledge at all and not everyone necessarily knows the
fact, we have private knowledge.
Let us illustrate the difference between these notions
with an example: Two friends, Agnes and Bertram, are
taking different trekking routes to the top of a moun-
tain. In the morning they agree that if the weather gets
bad, they will go back down and sleep in the mountain
hut at the base. Otherwise, they strongly prefer to stay
overnight at the top. The equipment essential for an
overnight stay at the top has been divided between their
backpacks. It is therefore crucial that if one of them de-
cides to go to the top, the other one does the same. On
the way to the top, they both observe a thunderstorm
approaching, but are uncertain about whether the other
person has seen it. At this point they both know the
fact that “a thunderstorm approaches”, but don’t know
whether the other knows. In this situation, we would say
that Agnes and Bertram both have private knowledge
that a thunderstorm approaches, and since they both
know it, it is also shared knowledge between them. More
generally, a fact is private knowledge in a group of agents
if some non-empty subset of the agents know the fact.
For the special case where everybody in the group knows
it, we say that there is shared knowledge to depth one (or
first-order shared knowledge) of the fact [3].
Since Bertram doesn’t know whether Agnes knows
about the thunderstorm, he would like to warn her. So
he sends a text message: “Thunderstorm approaching.
Let’s meet at base.” However, due to the unstable mo-
bile network signals, he is not certain that the message
will go through. Therefore he asks Agnes to confirm
that she has received the message. A few minutes later,
he receives her confirmation. At this point it has be-
come shared knowledge to depth two (or second-order
shared knowledge) that a thunderstorm is approaching:
She knows that he knows, since she received his message,
and he knows that she knows, because he received her
confirmation. To have shared knowledge to depth three
(third-order shared knowledge), it would additionally be
required that A) he knows that she knows that he knows,
and B) that she knows that he knows that she knows. In
fact, A already holds, since she confirmed receiving his
message. However, B doesn’t hold, since she will be un-
certain about whether her confirmation was received in
good order. Thus we have an asymmetry in the level of
knowledge of the two agents. If she also asks him to con-
firm her message, and she receives such a confirmation,
then of course she will get to know that he knows that
she knows. Then there will be shared knowledge to depth
three. However, there will still be a (higher-order) knowl-
edge asymmetry, since Bertram can’t be certain that the
last message was received.
How many messages back and forth does it take for
Agnes and Bertram to coordinate going back to the base
in the evening? At first it might seem that it is suffi-
cient for both of them to know that at least one of them
plans to go to the base. However, that is not so. Af-
ter the first message has been received, both know that
Bertram plans to go to the base, but he is still uncer-
tain whether she knows. And if she doesn’t, he might
risk leaving her alone at the top. So shared knowledge
to depth one is clearly not sufficient. Even shared knowl-
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2edge to depth two is not sufficient. After she has con-
firmed receiving his original message, from her perspec-
tive it is still entirely possible that he doesn’t know that
she knows, and hence, he might decide to go to the top
to not leave her alone. And in this case, she also has to
go to the top in order not to leave him alone. This ar-
gument can be generalised to prove that even nth-order
shared knowledge for any arbitrary large n is insufficient
for safe coordination.1 The consequence is that no finite
number of messages successfully delivered will guarantee
that Agnes and Bertram manage to meet at the base.
In order to guarantee meeting at the base, they would
need to have shared nth-order knowledge for all n ∈ N.
Shared nth-order knowledge of some fact for all n ∈ N is
called common knowledge of the fact. For a more formal
definition of private, shared and common knowledge, see
the Supplementary Information.
In practice, shouldn’t it be possible to coordinate meet-
ing at the base after one or two messages being sent back
and forth? Isn’t it a purely mathematical problem with
no practical implications for humans trying to coordinate
their actions? One of the main goals of this paper is to
argue that the answer to both questions is no. In order
to make that argument, we have designed a coordination
game that has a similar underlying mathematical struc-
ture as the example just given, but cast in a simpler, more
everyday-like setting, where the higher-order uncertainty
is established already when the game is initialised and
not, as above, through a series of message passings. The
game was originally developed to illustrate how the dif-
ference between shared and common knowledge can have
a real impact on human behaviour. Humans generally
find the concept of common knowledge hard to grasp,
and even harder to grasp the practical relevance of, due
to the unbounded nesting of knowledge involved. The
game we developed intends to make it clear that human
intuitions about common knowledge can be misleading
1 To derive a contradiction, suppose nth-order shared knowledge
for some n is sufficient to make it safe to go to the base, in the
sense of guaranteeing that the other person will also go there.
This implies that the succesful delivery of the nth message is
sufficient to guarantee meeting at the base. There must then
exist a smallest number n0 such that the succesful delivery of
the n0th message is sufficient to guarantee meeting at the base.
Since n0 is the smallest such number, the succesful delivery of
the (n0 − 1)st message is not sufficient to guarantee meeting at
the base. Now note that at the moment when the n0th message
has been successfully delivered, the sender of this message is still
uncertain about whether it was actually received, and hence the
sender is only certain that the first n0 − 1 messages has been
successfully delivered. In other words, the sender of the n0th
message considers it possible—even after the successful delivery
of the message—that only the first n0 − 1 messages were suc-
cessfully delivered, in which case it is not safe to go to the base.
Hence that person will after having sent the n0th message stil
consider it unsafe to go to the base, and will choose to go to the
top. This is a contradiction, completing the proof. This proof is
stated in rather informal terms, but can be turned into a formal,
mathematical proof [1].
and may have costly consequences.
The curse of shared knowledge
Reasoning about the knowledge of others, their reason-
ing about you, and your reasoning about their reasoning,
and so on, is famous in cognitive science for its presumed
computational intractability [6]. Because of this, coordi-
nating species typically use heuristic shortcuts in order to
work with nested knowledge states like common knowl-
edge, such as joint perceptual cues and broadcasted sig-
nals [7–9]. Humans may obtain common knowledge via
mutually accessible first-order sensory experiences [10–
13], eye contact [14], public rituals and conventions [2],
or salient focal points [15]. What most prominently is
believed to distinguish human coordination from other
animals, however, is the enormous flexibility by which
humans can imagine and articulate the mental states of
their peers [16, 17]. The abilities to blush, to tell jokes,
and to write novels testify that humans readily attribute
higher-order beliefs, intentions, and reasoning capabili-
ties to other people, such as thinking explicitly about the
mental states of others who think about the thoughts and
beliefs of others and so on, while at the same time ap-
preciating that those thoughts and beliefs can differ from
each other and from reality. Such higher-order cognition
has seen substantial scientific attention, and has brought
about various technical terms such as “theory of mind”
(ToM) [18], “mentalizing” [19], “mind reading” [20, 21],
“mental models” [22], “mind perception” [23], “perspec-
tive taking”, and “social intelligence” [24], which often
are used interchangeably for studying the cognitive mech-
anisms of shared knowledge, but sometimes focus on
slightly different ideas and associated meanings [25], de-
pending on the field of investigation.
Looking at the ToM-literature, conclusions about
human belief reasoning abilities are rather heteroge-
neous [26, 27]: Human reasoning about the reasoning
processes of other humans is limited [18, 28–33], contex-
tual, and possibly domain specific [34–36]. Three-year-
old children tend to fail in the well-known first-order false
belief tasks by falsely assuming that their private infor-
mation is shared by others, while second-order false be-
lief tasks are mastered around ages 5-7 [37, 38]. Adults
may reliably master up to four orders [39], but still have
difficulties ignoring the private information they possess
when assessing the beliefs of others, resulting in a curse
of knowledge bias which can compromise their ability to
make predictions about other people’s beliefs and ac-
tions [1, 40]. When the nested mental states represent
a succession of different people, such as “Alice thinks
that Bob thinks that Carol is contemplating the idea
that David is thinking about Evelyn”, we have less prob-
lems following along2 than when the nested mental states
2 Especially when those successions of mental states are qualified
by psychological attribute words such as ‘Alice thinks that Bob is
3are successions of the same people over and over again,
and thus are truly recursive, such as “I think that you
think that I contemplate the idea that you are thinking
about me”. We get confused more easily by the latter
formulation, since we need to keep track of several rep-
resentations of ourselves and of the other, each represen-
tation differing in its perspective and in the number of
mental states it presupposes [6]. When humans compete
or try to detect cheaters, higher-order belief reasoning
seems to perform better than lower-order belief reason-
ing [44]. In negotiations and other mixed motive situa-
tions, where innuendo, threads, bribes and other kinds
of indirect propositions are common, humans are very
good at the strategic use of higher-order belief reasoning,
for instance as a means to prevent common knowledge in
certain groups of agents, or as a means to form specific
knowledge alliances [45–47]. ToM proficiency may also
be facilitated by providing games with stepwise increase
in ToM [48].
In pure coordination problems, such as pedestrians
choosing sides, or people agreeing on new words or on
new technical standards, common knowledge is the pref-
ered informational state for all members of the group,
because it ensures that all sides find an optimal common
equilibrium. If there are no or limited means by which
to communicate, however, people face an equilibrium-
selection problem for which neither game theory nor the
ToM literature has any clear solution. Although some ex-
perimental evidence [49] suggests that higher-order ToM
reasoning may improve coordination efforts, other work
seems to suggest that coordination favours lower orders
of ToM sophistication [50, 51]. The challenge of tacit
coordination is particularly relevant for artificial intelli-
gence research and for social cognitive robotics, where
the implementation of ToM-like processes into artificial
social agents is believed to be an important step towards
reliable human-robot interaction [52–55].
Recently, researchers have investigated whether hu-
mans have adapted specifically to recognizing common
knowledge as a separate cognitive category, distinct from
both private and shared knowledge [6]. Controlled pure
coordination experiments in social settings on market
collaboration [56], the bystander effect [57], indirect
speech [58], self-conscious emotions [59], and charity [60],
consistently find that people indeed make strategically
different choices under common knowledge conditions
(typically presented in the form of public anouncements),
compared to situations in which there is only private
knowledge (in the form of private messages) or shared
knowledge (private messages that elaborate on the depth
of knowledge of other participants). Apart from seeing a
clear benefit of common knowledge, some of these studies
also showed that people have a hard time discriminating
mistakenly worrying that Carol is offended by misunderstanding
something Dave had said to Evelyn [42].
between various orders of shared knowledge, and that
coordination efforts do not correlate with payoff condi-
tions [56], which is in contrast to the assumptions of stan-
dard rational choice theory in which payoffs are expected
to be maximized [61].
So if humans indeed have adapted to recognize com-
mon knowledge in the wild, the question remains if they
are also able to recognize the difference between common
knowledge and nth-order shared knowledge for some (po-
tentially large) n. In other words, while humans are able
to reliably detect proper common knowledge in a wide
range of situations, how good are they at refraining from
inferring common knowledge in situations with only nth-
order shared knowledge? We do not know, in part be-
cause many existing experimental designs stop after de-
scribing 2-3 orders of belief reasoning to the participants,
as higher orders require quite convoluted sentences that
tend to become incomprehensible and increase experi-
mental error. Or, as in the mountain trekking example,
they require reasoning about the consequences of a high
number of (message passing) actions that each change
the mental state of the involved agents.
The latter has been explored theoretically in the ‘elec-
tronic mail game’ by Rubinstein [62], a game version
of the mountain trekking example presented above (and
of the structurally equivalent ‘coordinated attack prob-
lem’ [1]). The Rubinstein paper shows that ‘almost com-
mon knowledge’ in the sense of nth-order shared knowl-
edge for some large n, leads to a very different expected
player behaviour than ‘absolute common knowledge’. Es-
sentially his conclusion, translated into the context of the
mountain trekking example, is that common knowledge
will make the two mountain hikers both go to the base,
whereas if there is only nth-order shared knowledge for
some n, then both will meet at the top, independent of n
and despite the bad weather condition (resulting in non-
maximal payoffs). Rubinstein does a pure game-theoretic
analysis of the game with no experiments, and only spec-
ulates what people playing the game might do. We find
it interesting to dig deeper into how humans would play
and reason about such games in practice. What would
their intuition recommend them to do? Which depth of
shared knowledge (if any) would be enough to attempt
risky coordination that would lead to maximal payoff if
successful? How would they be certain that the person
they try to coordinate with thinks that the same depth
is sufficient?
The electronic mail game and the mountain trekking
example are complicated in terms of the dynamics of it-
erated message passing. In this paper, we devise a novel
game in which the higher orders of shared knowledge are
not achieved dynamically via actions, but are already
present at the beginning of the game, using uncertainty
about arrival times. This, we believe, makes the game
easier to understand. Letting humans play our game,
we have been able to address the previous questions in
more detail. Our results show that people indeed have a
very hard time accepting the fact that common knowl-
4edge is not reducible to shared knowledge of finite depth.
On the contrary, participants try to coordinate even at
the shallowest depths of shared knowledge and in spite
of huge payoff risks. The reason, we believe, is that the
sole presence of shared knowledge is enough to make par-
ticipants try to coordinate, and that moderate depths
of shared knowledge become effectively indistinguishable
from common knowledge due to the recursive nature of
the game. We call this effect “the curse of shared knowl-
edge” because even small depths of shared knowledge
raises the participant’s expectation of being able to co-
ordinate in spite of repeated payoff penalties for having
miscoordinated before.
Experimental Design
The experiment is designed as a two-player coordination
game with imperfect information. The game is inspired
by the structure of the consecutive number riddle, also
called the Conway paradox, see e.g. van Emde Boas et al.
[63], van Ditmarsch and Kooi [64]. Our game is framed
as an everyday situation, where two colleagues arrive
at their workplace in the morning, and have to decide
whether to meet in the canteen for a morning coffee or
go straight to their offices and start working immediately.
We call the game the ‘Canteen Dilemma’. The purpose
of framing it in an everyday situation is to attempt to
make some of the recursive reasoning easier to compre-
hend [65, 66]. The introductory story of the game goes
as follows:
“Every morning you arrive at work between
8:10 am and 9:10 am. You and your colleague
will arrive by bus 10 minutes apart. Example:
You arrive at 8:40 am. Your colleague may
arrive at 8:30 am, or 8:50 am. Both of you
like to meet in the canteen for a cup of coffee.
If you arrive before 9:00 am, you have time
to go to the canteen, but you should only go
if your colleague goes to the canteen as well.
If you or your colleague arrive at 9:00 am or
after, you should go straight to your offices.”
The game has 10 rounds on MTurk and participants are
told that at the beginning of each round they will know
only their own arrival time, and based on this will have
to decide whether to go to the canteen or the office. Af-
ter choosing an option, participants are asked to estimate
their certainty that their colleague will choose the same
option (on a five-point Likert scale). We call the value
chosen the certainty estimate of the participant. A fixed
participation fee of $2 is given to all players who finish
the game. Additional bonuses are calculated with a log-
arithmic scoring rule whereby each participant is given
an initial bonus of $10, which is then reduced by a vari-
able penalty in each round, depending on the players’
decisions and certainty estimates.
The game has three possible outcomes: 1) both choose
the canteen which we refer to as coordination into the
canteen; 2) both choose their respective offices which we
refer to as coordination into the offices; 3) one chooses
the canteen and the other chooses the office which we
refer to as miscoordination. Penalties are tiered in such
a way that a small penalty is deducted for successful co-
ordination into the canteen (achieving the highest pay-
off), which is doubled for coordination into the offices
(achieving the second-highest payoff), while the penalty
for miscoordination or forbidden choices, i.e. going to the
canteen at 9 am or after, is much larger (up to 921 times
larger, meaning a significantly lower payoff than the pre-
vious two). See Materials and Methods for details about
the payoff structure. In the instructions shown to the
participants beforehand, we also include payoff examples
of both successful and failed coordinations. Screenshots
and full descriptions of the experimental setup can be
found in the Supplementary Information.
For the main experiment, we recruited a total of 680
participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to
play for a maximum of 10 rounds, making a total of
n = 4260 choices. In addition, we conducted two supple-
mentary classroom experiments with 80 students (DTU1
- n = 2160) from the Technical University of Denmark
(DTU) taking a course on Artificial Intelligence and
Multi-Agent Systems, and 42 additional student (DTU2
- n = 1012) taking an introductory course in Artifi-
cial Intelligence. The two classroom experiments differed
slightly from the MTurk experiment in that the students
got an initial bonus (endowment) of $30 instead of $10,
and played 30 rounds instead of 10. Also, in the class-
room experiments, all students were told that they would
not receive any monetary rewards for playing the game,
but they should still try to do their best. The students
also had to answer a few additional post-game questions,
see the Supplementary Information for a full list of those
questions.
Game Strategies
What are the relevant strategies for this game? First note
that going to the canteen at 9:00 or after results in the
worst possible payoff. So both players should always go
to the office if they arrive at 9:00 or after. How about if
both arrive strictly before 9:00? If both choose canteen,
they getter a better payoff than if both choose office. Now
consider a case where you are one of the players, and you
arrive at 8:50. Then your colleague will be arriving at
either 9:00 or 8:40. If your colleague arrives at 9:00, she
has to choose office according to the previous argument,
and then you would have to choose office as well to avoid
the large penalty of miscoordination. However, if your
colleague arrives at 8:40, you may both choose the can-
teen, and this will lead to the highest payoff. In other
words, depending on the arrival time of your colleague,
a piece of information that you don’t have access to, the
best choice is either office or canteen. So which one to
choose?
Since the penalty of miscoordination is very high, it
would seem best to choose office. What if you then in-
stead arrive at 8:40? In this case, your colleague either
5arrives at 8:30 or 8:50. In both cases, you have time
to meet for a cup of coffee in the canteen, and doing so
will give you the highest payoff. At first, it might seem
like an easy choice. However, we just concluded that the
best strategy at 8:50 would be to go to the office. So, if
you arrive at 8:40 and contemplate that your colleague
might arrive at 8:50—and if you believe your colleague
would reason as yourself and go to the office at 8:50—
you also ought to go to the office at 8:40. This argument
can of course be iterated, because if the optimal choice
at 8:40 is to go to the office, then the optimal choice at
8:30 must also be to go to the office. In other words,
the optimal strategy seems to be to always go to the of-
fice, independent of arrival time! And, indeed, so it is.
If both players go to the office in all rounds and declare
the highest possible certainty in their decision, they will
both leave the experiment with $9.80, excluding the $2
participation fee. This is the highest possible payoff that
can be guaranteed by any strategy in the game, and very
close to the $10 that the players start out with. As we
will see later, the payoffs that people actually get when
playing the game are significantly lower than this.
The all-office strategy described above, where you al-
ways decide to go to the office independent of arrival time,
is a safe strategy if both players follow it. By safe is meant
that there is never any risk of miscoordination, and hence
no risk of getting the highest penalty (the penalty for
miscoordination is up to $9.21 in a single round). It is
actually the only safe strategy. The reason is that if at
least one of the players, say a, has the strategy of going
to the canteen at some time t before 9:00, then since they
both have to go to the office at 9:00 or later, there must
exist at least one pair of arrival times for which the two
players are miscoordinated.3
The fact that the all-office strategy is the only safe one
is counter-intuitive to most people before being presented
with the proof, and for some people even after. The issue
is that, intuitively, it would seem to be safe to go to the
canteen at, say, 8:30. Why would you ever go to the
office that early? You know that your colleague will then
be arriving at 8:40, which is still plenty of time to get
a cup of coffee before 9:00. The issue is of course that
if you take the perspective of your colleague, then your
colleague arriving at 8:40 will consider it possible that
you arrived at 8:50. And if you had indeed arrived at
8:50, you would consider it possible that your colleague
had arrived at 9:00. In that case you would be forced to
3 Since a chooses to go to the canteen at time t, player b also has to
go to the canteen at time t + 10, since otherwise whey would be
miscoordinated when a arrives at t and b at t+ 10. But if b goes
to the canteen at time t + 10, a also has to go to the canteen at
time t+ 20, since otherwise they would be miscoordinated when
b arrives at t + 10 and a at t + 20. This can be generalized to
conclude that a would have to go to the canteen at any time
t + 20x for x ≥ 0 and b would have to go to the canteen at any
time t + 10 + 20y for y ≥ 0. Clearly this implies going to the
canteen after 9:00.
choose the office. A major point of our experiments is to
test whether this kind of recursive perspective-taking is
utilized by human players of the game.
The argument of the all-office strategy being safe of
course relies on the other player following the same strat-
egy. Since we don’t allow players to agree on a strategy
with their co-player beforehand, the all-office strategy
doesn’t necessarily in practice lead to the highest payoff
for a particular player. Another issue is that one might
decide to play risky instead of safe. Consider the canteen-
before-9 strategy of always going to the canteen before
9:00 and going to the office at later times, all with the
highest certainty estimate. If both players choose this
strategy and are fortunate to play 10 rounds without any
of them arriving at 9:00 or later, they will get the highest
possible payoff of $9.90—slightly higher than the guaran-
teed payoff $9.80 of the all-office strategy. However, if all
pairs of arrival times are equally likely, the probability of
miscoordination is then 1/6 (there are 12 pairs of arrival
times in total, and 2 of those have one player arriving
at 8:50 and the other at 9:00). Miscoordination with
the highest possible certainty estimate gives a penalty of
$9.21, so in practice this strategy is of course still sig-
nificantly worse than the all-office strategy, even if only
playing one round (the expected payoff for a single-round
game will be $10.00− $9.21 · 1/6− $0.01 · 5/6 = $8.46).
In the Methods section we make the reasoning about
game strategies formally precise. We show that indepen-
dently of the particular payoff structure (only using the
order of the payoffs, not their exact values), there will
only be two candidates for the optimal strategy, the all-
office strategy and the canteen-before-9 strategy. Which
one is then optimal depends on the particular payoff
structure and the number of arrival times before and after
9 am. In our specific experiments with our specific ar-
rival times and payoff structure, the all-office strategy has
a significantly higher expected utility than the canteen-
before-9 strategy, as already argued. As we will see, the
human players in our experiments very rarely play any
of these strategies, but seem to believe that it is safe to
go to the canteen if arriving sufficiently ahead of 9 am,
e.g. before 8:50, but unsafe when arriving later.
A strategy to always go to the canteen if arriving before
some cut-off time tc and always go to the office if arriving
after tc is called a cut-off strategy (with cut-off tc). The
canteen-before-9 strategy is a cut-off strategy with cut-off
8:55 (see Materials and Methods for more details).
Results
The maximal theoretical payoff described in the previous
section was never observed in the experiments—actually
quite far from it, despite doing the experiment with more
than 800 people. Recall that the payoff of the all-office
strategy is $9.80 independent of arrival times. The av-
erage bonus paid to our MTurk participants was a mere
$2.36. Due to the penalty-based payoff structure, only
46 out of 340 MTurk groups (14%) were able to play 10
rounds and still have any bonus left, while the average
6number of rounds played was 6.3, see Table I. As soon
as one of the players had no money left, the game would
terminate.
Exp. N R r¯ Ruin (%) Payoff (%) s¯ ($)
MTurk 680 10 6.3 52.8 23.6 -1.59
DTU1 80 30 27.0 17.5 27.0 -0.83
DTU2 42 30 24.1 31.0 24.1 -0.98
TABLE I: Exp. = experiment; N = number of subjects; R =
maximum number of rounds; r¯ = average number of rounds
played; Ruin = percentage of participants loosing all their
bonus before (or in) round R; Payoff = average earnings (given
as the retained percentage of the initial endowment); s¯ =
average penalty per player per round.
Comparing the MTurk experiment with the DTU ex-
periments in Table I, shows that the DTU participants
were slightly better on average. While more than half of
the MTurk participants had lost their initial bonus and
had to end the game before the last round, only 18%
and 31% of the DTU participants, respectively, had done
so. Especially the students from the Artificial Intelli-
gence and Multi-Agent Systems course (DTU1) managed
well by retaining 27% of the initial endowment and loos-
ing only $0.83 per round on average. This may come as
no surprise, because these students were later into their
studies, and had already been taught about social cogni-
tion.
Looking at Figure 1, we see the frequency of par-
ticipants’ canteen choices as a function of their arrival
time together with a fitted binary logistic regression line.
While DTU students (orange and green) show similar
steep profiles, MTurk participants have a slightly more
gradual decline in canteen choices for increasing arrival
times. However, the point at which there is a 50% proba-
bility of choosing the canteen or the office (see Materials
and Methods) is close to 8:50 in all three experiments.
In the Discussion we therefore combine all three experi-
ments in Figure 5 in order to understand the experimen-
tal results in terms of degrees of shared knowledge.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of certainty estimates
for each arrival time. It clearly shows that it is exceed-
ingly rare for any of the participants to consider it even
problematic to go to the canteen when arriving early.
Arriving at 8:40 or earlier is deemed sufficiently early to
visit the canteen with high confidence, arriving at 9:00
or later is deemed office time with high confidence, and
arriving at 8:50 is deemed either office or canteen with
at least being “somewhat certain”. The difference in cer-
tainty estimates between MTurk participants and DTU
students show that the latter tend to be more certain that
their co-players follow a similar strategy (higher certainty
estimates for the early and late arrival times), and also
that they are more aware of the danger of miscoordina-
tion (lower certainty estimates around the cut-off). This
is in particular the case for the DTU1 experiment that
has the steepest profile. Being more certain that your co-
players follow a similar strategy probably indicates that
you believe such a strategy to be optimal. So, interest-
ingly, the DTU1 participants are both the ones that ap-
pear to be most aware of the danger of miscoordination,
and at the same time those who most firmly believe a
cut-off strategy is optimal, i.e., believing that the risk of
miscoordination is unavoidable. The differences between
the three experiments are however still relatively minor,
and in the following we will combine data from all three
experiments.
Group dynamics
Starting with the group dynamics in Figure 12, we see
the number of successful group coordinations into the
canteen/office (green/purple) together with the number
of miscoordinations (red) as a function of all possible
arrival time combinations. The figure shows clearly that
players are able to coordinate into the canteen more than
80% of the time if both of them arrive before 8:50. As
soon as a group has a player who arrives at 8:50, however,
the result changes drastically. Suddenly almost half of
such groups miscoordinate. As players experience harsh
penalties for miscoordinating, one could perhaps expect
to see a tendency of choosing office more often when ar-
riving at 8:40 or 8:50 in subsequent rounds. That is,
we might expect that players learn and converge to the
all-office strategy in order to avoid miscoordination alto-
gether. But this is not what we see.
Figure 4 shows the mean frequency of canteen choices
as a function of rounds played for all three experiments.
Each color corresponds to a certain arrival time. Clearly,
the only arrival times that do not converge towards either
the canteen or the office are the arrival times of 8:40 and
8:50, with the former fluctuating around 90% canteen
choices and the latter fluctuating around 50% canteen
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FIG. 1: Frequency of canteen choices as a function of arrival
times. Circles indicate the mean frequency of participants
choosing the canteen at a certain arrival time with error bars.
Colored lines are logistic regression lines with bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals (10.000 resamples) shown as translu-
cent bands. Fitted parameters show significant differences for
all three experiments.
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FIG. 2: Violin plots of certainty estimates. In each round,
participants were asked how certain they were of successful co-
ordination with their colleague. Blue areas show the results
from MTurk (n = 4260) and orange areas show the results
from DTU1 and DTU2 combined (n = 3172). We predefined
a five point likert scale of certainty estimates as: ‘very un-
certain’, ‘slightly certain, ‘somewhat certain’, ‘quite certain’,
and ‘very certain’, and translated them into the numerical
values of probability estimates used in the payoff calculations
(see Materials and Methods).
choices. This indicates that participants arriving at 8:40
or 8:50 do not feel incentivized to change their behavior
significantly in subsequent rounds, even though there is a
high risk of miscoordination. This is not to say that par-
ticipants do not learn that canteen choices at 8:40 or 8:50
are dangerous. Partitioning the data from Figure 1 into
two bins, corresponding to groups having had no mis-
coordination and groups having had one or more misco-
ordinations (see the supplementary data analysis in the
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FIG. 3: Number of coordinations and miscoordinations as a
function of arrival times. Green means coordinating into the
canteen, purple means coordinating into the office, and red
means miscoordination. We use the notation 8:00/8:10 to de-
note the union of the arrival pairs (8:00, 8:10) and (8:10, 8:00),
i.e., the arrival time combinations where one of the players ar-
rive at 8:00 and the other at 8:10. Miscoordinations approach
50% at 8:40/8:50 and 8:50/9:00.
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FIG. 4: Mean frequencies of canteen choices for all possible
arrival times as a function of the number of rounds played.
The fitted straight lines are weighted linear squares (WLS)
with the weights chosen to be the square root of the number of
data points constituting the mean frequencies for each round,
also shown by dot size.
Supplementary Information), shows somewhat decreas-
ing certainty estimates around the critical arrival times,
especially for DTU student. However, this does not affect
their actual choices. MTurk participants do choose the
canteen a little less often after a miscoordination (see
Figure S6 in the Supplementary Information), but this
does not translate into better payoffs as later miscoordi-
nations just move to earlier arrival times. So even though
participants learn that their choices are risky, they don’t
see any way to improve their strategy. Specifically, they
never converge to the optimal all-office strategy, and also
not to the alternative canteen-before-9 strategy (cf. The-
orem 4 in Materials and Methods). This apparent lack of
behavioral change in higher-order social reasoning games
is also shown in Verbrugge & Mol [67].
Discussion
Let us try to analyse the experimental results in terms of
the depth of knowledge of the participants. The highest
payoff is achieved when coordinating into the canteen be-
fore 9 am. With the aim of achieving the highest possible
payoff, each participant can be expected to consider her
own arrival time and try to assess whether there is still
time to meet in the canteen. When a participant arrives
strictly before 9 am, i.e. at 8:50 or earlier, she has private
knowledge that she arrives sufficiently early to go to the
canteen. If participants only make choices based on their
private knowledge, we should then expect participants to
always go to the canteen at 8:50. This is not what we
see, cf. Figure 1. Thus, other considerations in addition
to the player’s private knowledge must play a role in their
decision-making.
When participants know that they both have arrived
before 9:00, they have shared knowledge of having ar-
rived in time for going to the canteen. This happens for
any arrival pair (t1, t2) with ti ≤ 8:50, i = 1, 2 (where,
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FIG. 5: The solid black lines express indistinguishability for the players, e.g. the arrival time 8:40 for player 1 has a line
to both of the arrival times 8:30 and 8:50 for player 2, since these are the two arrival times for player 2 that player 1 will
consider possible when herself arriving at 8:40. Below each possible arrival time, we have marked the highest level of knowledge
concerning whether there is sufficient time to go to the canteen, e.g. when arriving at 8:40 there is shared knowledge to depth 1
of this fact, but not shared knowledge to depth 2. In blue, a binary logistic regression model was used to predict the probability
of a participant going to the canteen (upper limit) or to the office (lower limit) at the shown arrival times. The width of the
regression line indicates the 95% confidence interval using 10.000 bootstrapped resamples of all choices in all three experiments
(N = 7432).
again, an arrival pair (t1, t2) denotes that player 1 arrives
at time t1 and player 2 at time t2). Note that for an ar-
rival pair (8:50, 8:40), there is shared knowledge of there
being sufficient time to go to the canteen, but only player
2 knows this fact: Player 2 knows that also player 1 must
have arrived before 9:00, but player 1 doesn’t know this
about player 2. In other words, when a player arrives at
8:50, that player considers it possible that there is shared
knowledge of being sufficient time for a cup of coffee in
the canteen, but only if arriving at 8:40 or before will
that player know there to be shared knowledge (to depth
1). When arriving at 8:30 or before, the player addi-
tionally knows there to be shared knowledge to depth 2.
We illustrate this in Figure 5. Note that in general, if a
player arrives at time 8:50−10n, n > 0, then that player
knows that there is nth-order shared knowledge, but the
player doesn’t know there to be (n + 1)st-order shared
knowledge. This follows a similar pattern as the moun-
tain trekking example, except here the depth of shared
knowledge is determined by how early ahead of 9 am
the agents arrive, rather than how many messages have
successfully been delivered. No number of messages was
sufficient to achieve common knowledge in the mountain
trekking example. We similarly get that no arrival time
is sufficiently early to establish common knowledge about
having time to meet in the canteen.
The participants seem to clearly be able to distin-
guish between private and shared knowledge, which is
supported by their significantly different choices at 8:50
and 8:40 (see again Figure 5). However, it is less clear
whether they are able to robustly distinguish different
levels of shared knowledge, and whether they are able to
distinguish that from common knowledge. Indeed, most
participants relatively robustly choose the canteen at 8:40
and any time before that, despite the difference in depth
of shared knowledge in those possible arrival times. The
certainty estimates are however slowly decreasing from
8:10 to 8:50 in all three experiments (see Figure 2), show-
ing that the participants are not completely ignorant to
the differences. This could suggest that many partici-
pants are aware that it is less safe to go to the canteen
based on nth-order shared knowledge than (n+1)st-order
shared knowledge. However, very few seem to draw the
conclusion that it is never safe to go to the canteen. Our
game theoretic analysis showed that they ought to only
choose the canteen when there is common knowledge that
it is safe, which in this case actually means never.
Why do participants not regard earlier office choices as
viable options? Why do participants not continue their
train of thought and deduce that when 8:50 turns out to
be unsafe, 8:40 will become unsafe as well, which means
that 8:30 will be unsafe also, etc.? One reason may be
that the benefits of an all-office strategy are cognitively
unavailable for the participants in the sense that partic-
ipants have a limited ability to take the perspective of
each other recursively. Another reason may be that the
benefits of an all-office strategy are (vaguely) understood,
but participants do not believe that their colleague will
reason the same way as they do themselves, and instead
try to guess what their colleague will choose. One can-
didate of such a (mixed) strategy may be the following:
1) always go to the canteen before 8:50, 2) always go-
ing to the office after 8:50, and 3) do some guesswork
at 8:50. The arrival time combinations 8:40/8:50 and
8:50/9:00 will then coordinate 50% of the time, match-
ing well with what we observe in Figure 12. If this is
the strategy followed, players should also be aware of the
50% probability of miscoordination at 8:50. In Figure 2,
we indeed see a much lower certainty estimate at those
arrival times.
9Probing theses questions further, we asked participants
the following post-game question:
“Imagine you could have agreed beforehand
with your colleague about a point in time
where it is safe to go to the canteen. What
time would that be?” (’I don’t know’, ’There
is no such time’, 8:00, 8:10, 8:20, 8:30, 8:40,
8:50, 9:00, 9:10)
The results in Figure 6A show that most answers range
from 8:30 to 8:50 (approximately 75 % of all answers),
giving support to the verdict that participants are not
able to continue taking the perspective of each other re-
cursively, or at least that they believe that shared knowl-
edge of some modest finite depth is sufficient for the can-
teen choice to be safe. Rather, they stop after one or two,
possibly three, iterations, thus believing that as long as
they arrive sufficiently early, they can be sure to coordi-
nate safely in the canteen. Notice that the correct answer
“there is no such time” is chosen by less than 4% of all
participants, close to the margin of random error.
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FIG. 6: A) Frequencies of answers to the question: “Imagine
you could have agreed beforehand with your colleague about
a point in time where it is safe to go to the canteen. What
time would that be?” Due to the pragmatics of language, we
assume that an answer like 8:30 entails the belief that all ear-
lier arrival times would also be deemed safe. B) Frequencies
of answers to the question: “Imagine you arrive at 8:10. Is
it common knowledge between you and your colleague that
it is safe to go to the canteen, that is, that you both arrived
before 9:00?”
This indicates that participants indeed do believe that
there exists a strategy that includes canteen choices with-
out the risk of miscoordination, supporting the conjec-
ture stated in the introduction that moderate depths
of shared knowledge become effectively indistinguishable
from common knowledge. Participants might of course
not necessarily have a precise idea of the technical no-
tion of common knowledge, but as discussed in the in-
troduction, there is actually quite a number of studies
demonstrating that humans have adapted to recognize
common knowledge and making distinct strategic choices
depending on whether there is common, shared or pri-
vate knowledge. In our experiments, we see the player
behavior stabilizing already at relatively modest depths
of shared knowledge, both in terms of action choices and
certainty estimates. And that player behavior matches
what we would expect to see if they indeed wrongly infer
common knowledge from shared knowledge to some finite
depth.
To specifically address the issue of whether they
wrongly infer common knowledge, we asked a final post-
game question:
“Imagine you arrive at 8:10 am. Is it common
knowledge between you and your colleague
that it is safe to go to the canteen, that is,
you both arrived before 9:00 am?”. (‘Yes’,
‘No’, ‘Don’t know’)
This question inquires about participants’ understand-
ing of the term ‘common knowledge’, and how it ap-
plies to the given situation. In Figure 6B, the results
show that 89% of all participants responded that it was
common knowledge that both players arrived before 9:00,
when they themselves had arrived at 8:10. The answers
may signify that indeed they believe there to be common
knowledge in the strict technical (logical) sense. But of
course the answers could also pertain to the everyday lin-
guistic usage of the term ’common knowledge’, which is
less strict.
Conclusion
We have devised a new coordination game, the Canteen
Dilemma, to investigate human higher-order social rea-
soning. Our experimental results show that high levels
of recursive perspective-taking are cognitively unavail-
able to the vast majority of players of the game. We see
a significant amount of miscoordination, which seems to
occur due to a “curse of shared knowledge”: the guise of
common knowledge existing in situations where there is
only shared knowledge to some limited depth.
Our experience from playing the Canteen Dilemma
with many people and explaining to them its unintuitive
result, is that many players simply do not accept the ar-
gument that they cannot at any time coordinate safely
into the canteen. On top of this, the certainty of partici-
pants that they will coordinate into the canteen at early
arrival times indicates that when participants fail at nth-
order reasoning, they do not default to agnosticism, but
the opposite. That is, when there is a sufficiently large
order of shared knowledge about a fact, it is possible
that such a fact is mistaken for proper common knowl-
edge. An interesting avenue for future research would be
to investigate if there may be any social and psycholog-
ical benefits of having an illusion of common knowledge,
such as a higher willingness to cooperate. Thus, what we
have called the ’curse’ of shared knowledge in the Can-
teen Dilemma, may turn out to be a blessing in other
settings.
An obvious question is how often this illusion of com-
mon knowledge occurs in real life. For instance, in the
real-world version of the Canteen Dilemma scenario, the
two colleagues would be likely to simply coordinate their
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actions via cell phone (“I’ll arrive at 8:50 today. Are you
up for a cup of coffee in the canteen?”). This suggests
that the advent of modern technology could have made
the information asymmetry inherent in shared knowledge
situations less widespread. However, modern technology
has also given us the Internet and social media, where
the flow of information is much more complex, creating
more intricate cases of information asymmetry than ever
before.
That humans tend to confuse shared and common
knowledge could possibly be due to a limited evolution-
ary importance of being able to make the distinction. It
could also be due to the distinction requiring too many
cognitive ressources. Or it could be that the confusion
actually leads to evolutionary benefits in terms of higher
degrees of cooperation in most practically occurring set-
tings. What exactly has lead to the confusion, and to
what degree it has any practical importance today, we
leave as open problems.
Methods
Experimental design and data collection
Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk had a total of 714
participants (including dropouts, see Supplementary Infor-
mation), while the two classroom experiments at the Tech-
nical University of Denmark (DTU1 and DTU2) had a to-
tal of 106 and 50 participants, respectively. The average
payout to MTurk workers was $4.17 (including a general
participation fee of $2). After accepting our task and pro-
viding informed consent, participants from MTurk were put
in a ’waiting room’ until they were paired up with an-
other participant. After an instructions page, detailing the
rules of the game, participants were given an arrival time
t ∈ {8:00, 8:10, 8:20, 8:30, 8:40, 8:50, 9:00, 9:10} and asked to
make a decision between between going to the canteen or to
the office. Next, participants were asked to estimate how cer-
tain they were that their ‘colleague’ made the same choice
as them, ranging from ‘very uncertain’ over ‘slightly certain’,
‘somewhat certain’ and ‘quite certain’ to ‘very certain’, which
were translated into numerical values, ei, used in the payoff
calculations (see below). A results page was shown between
each round, showing the results of the previous rounds, includ-
ing arrival times for both players, their choices, their own cer-
tainty estimates and resulting payoffs. After 30 seconds, the
game would automatically proceed to the next round. After
the last round, we asked all participants a few final questions
about their strategy and their understanding of the game.
The experiments were implemented using oTree 2.1.35 [68].
The two classroom experiments DTU1 and DTU2 differed
from the MTurk experiment in a few aspects: 1) the maximum
number of rounds played was increased from 10 to 30; 2) the
initial bonus given each participant was increased accordingly
from $10 to $30; 3) three additional questions were asked in
order to elicit more explicitly some of the implicit assumptions
and explicit behaviours by the students; 4) participants were
told that they would not receive any monetary rewards, but
that they should try to do their best. DTU1 received prizes.
Screenshots, additional questions, experimental settings, and
a detailed walk-through can be found in the Supplementary
Information.
Payoffs and penalties
All MTurk players finishing the game were paid a partici-
pation fee of $2. In addition, a bonus could be earned if
players did well. Before the game started, the bonus was set
to $10 for all participants. After each round, the bonus was
reduced by a personal penalty, depending on the two players’
choices. Penalties are calculated using a logarithmic scor-
ing rule and by ordering them to be minimized by success-
ful coordinations into the canteen. Penalties are maximized
by any type of miscoordination or forbidden choice (i.e. go-
ing to the canteen at 9 am or later). Office coordinations
are designed to have larger penalties than canteen coordina-
tions, but smaller penalties than miscoordinations in order to
make sure that coordination remains the main objective of the
game. Penalties are defined as negative utility values in the
following way. First, we define the chosen action ai by player
i, i = 1, 2, to take binary values encoding the canteen option
(ai = 0) and the office option (ai = 1), and define their re-
spective certainty estimates ei ∈ {0.5, 0.625, 0.75, 0.875, 0.99}.
We can then express the utility u received by player 1 as
u(e1, a1, a2) = (1−|a1−a2|+a1a2)ln(e1)+2|a1−a2|ln(1−e1),
and symmetric for player 2. If any of the players choose the
canteen at 9 am or after, the utility becomes u(e1, a1, a2) =
2ln(1 − e1) for player 1 (and symmetric for player 2), cor-
responding to a miscoordination. As an example, imagine
player 1 arrives at 8:40 and choses the canteen, a1 = 0. She
estimates the probability that her colleague also will to go
to the canteen to “somewhat certain”, e1 = 0.75. If her
colleague indeed chooses the canteen, a2 = 0, her utility
will be u(e1, a1, a2) = ln(e1) = −0.29, but if her predic-
tion proves false and her colleague chooses the office instead,
her utility will be u(e1, a1, a2) = 2ln(1 − e1) = −2.77. If
she goes to the office just like her colleague, her utility is
u(e1, a1, a2) = 2ln(e1) = −0.58. It should be noted that
the logarithmic scoring rule used here is not strictly proper
since office and canteen coordinations are penalized differ-
ently. Nevertheless, we find a good match between estimates
and actual choices at arrival times different from those that
are prone to miscoordinations, as seen in Figure 2, indicating
that loss minimization remained a central concern and that
participants made their choices and estimates as honestly as
possible [69, 70].
Formal Analysis
The game can be represented as a game with three players,
nature, player 1 and player 2. Nature is the player that ini-
tially decides the arrival times of player 1 and 2. Then player
1 and 2 are each informed of their own arrival time, and each
have to choose among two actions: o for going to the office
and c for going to the canteen. Based on the choice of actions
by all three agents, player 1 and 2 receive a payoff, and they
always receive the same payoff (we are disregarding the cer-
tainty estimates for now). The action choice of nature can be
represented as an arrival pair t = (t1, t2) consisting of the ar-
rival time t1 for player 1 and t2 for player 2. Any arrival pair
t has to satisfy that |t1 − t2| = 10 minutes (we will suppress
mentioning the unit, minutes, in the following). In our spe-
cific version of the game, we additionally have the restriction
that 8:10 ≤ ti ≤ 9:10 for i = 1, 2. The analysis of optimal
strategies however doesn’t depend on the exact arrival times
available, so we will make things a bit more general and only
assume that there is an earliest arrival time tmin and a lat-
est arrival time tmax, and that tmin ≤ 8:50 and tmax ≥ 9:00.
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Given tmin and tmax, the set of possible arrival pairs is de-
fined as T = {(t, t+ 10) | tmin ≤ t ≤ tmax − 10} ∪ {(t, t− 10) |
tmin + 10 ≤ t ≤ tmax}.
The game starts by nature choosing an element t ∈ T . Na-
ture is not a strategic player, so we assume that t is chosen
uniformly at random, which is exactly how t is chosen in our
experiments. The participants do not know that the arrival
times are chosen uniformly at random, as this is left implicit
in the description of the game. The following analysis of opti-
mal strategies in the game could potentially change if arrival
times were chosen according to a highly skewed probability
distribution.
When nature has chosen its action t ∈ T and player 1
and 2 have chosen their actions a1 and a2, player 1 and 2
receive their payoff, which we denote ut(a1, a2) (the utility
resulting from player 1 choosing a1 and player 2 choosing
a2 given that nature played t). We don’t need to make any
assumptions regarding the exact utility values (payoff values),
except that succesful coordination into the canteen is always
better than succesful coordination into the offices, which again
is always better than being miscoordinated. Hence, we put
the following constraints on the utility function, for all t ∈ T ,
(U1) If t1, t2 < 9:00 then ut(c, c) > ut(o, o) > ut(c, o) =
ut(o, c).
(U2) If ti ≥ 9:00 for some i, then ut(o, o) > ut(c, o) =
ut(o, c) = ut(c, c).
A strategy for player i, i = 1, 2, is a mapping from arrival
pairs to actions, that is, a mapping si : T → {c, o}. A strategy
for i simply determines which action i will choose given the
arrival pair. Each agent only observes her own arrival time,
that is, any two arrival pairs t and t′ with ti = t′i will be
indistinguishable to player i, i = 1, 2. This immediately leads
to the following formal definition of the indistinguishability
relation ∼i for player i: t ∼i t′ iff ti = t′i. We need to require
the strategy of each player to be uniform, that is, any two
arrival pairs that are indistinguishable by that player should
be mapped to the same action: if t ∼i t′ then si(t) = si(t′).
Due to the uniformity condition, we can allow ourselves to
overload the meaning of the symbol si and write si(ti) as an
abbreviation of si(t1, t2) for i = 1, 2.
Note that the defined strategies are memoryless (Markov
strategies), that is, a player’s choice only depends on the ob-
served arrival time in the current round, not the history of
arrival times and chosen actions in earlier rounds. Human
players playing the game should not be expected to necessar-
ily play memoryless strategies, as they might seek to adopt to
the observed strategy of the other player. However, since it is
a repeated game (every round is a new instance of the same
game), perfectly rational players playing the game for a suffi-
cient number of rounds should converge to an optimal mem-
oryless strategy. We will leave further discussion of history-
dependent strategies and focus on the optimal memoryless
strategies in the following.
Given strategies s1 and s2, the pair s = (s1, s2) is called
a strategy profile. Given an arrival pair t = (t1, t2), we use
s(t) as a shorthand for (s1(t1), s2(t2)). Hence s(t) denotes
the choices made by players 1 and 2 when their strategies
are given by s and their arrival times are given by t. The
payoff of those choices is then ut(s(t)). We will use ut(s) as
an abbreviation of ut(s(t)), i.e., ut(s) is the utility received
by player 1 and 2 when they play by strategy profile s in
the game with arrival pair t. The expected utility EU(s) of a
strategy profile s is the average of the payoffs [71]:
EU(s) =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
ut(s).
Note again that player 1 and 2 get the same payoff (common-
payoff game), so there is only one expected utility value to
be computed. A strategy profile s′ Pareto dominates another
strategy profile s if EU(s′) > EU(s) [71]. A strategy profile is
Pareto optimal if there does not exist another strategy profile
dominating it. A strategy profile s′ weakly Pareto dominates
another strategy profile s if EU(s′) ≥ EU(s). The game is
cooperative (between player 1 and 2), so both players should
seek to play a Pareto optimal strategy profile. Also, since it
is a common-payoff game, all Pareto optimal strategy profiles
have the same expected utility [71].
Define subsets of arrival pairs T1, T2 ⊆ T by:
T1 = {(8:10 + 20x, 8:20 + 20y) ∈ T | y ≤ x ≤ y + 1}
T2 = {(8:20 + 20y, 8:10 + 20x) ∈ T | y ≤ x ≤ y + 1}
Note that T1 and T2 are disjoint and that T = T1 ∪ T2. We
hence get, for any strategy profile s,
EU(s) =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
ut(s) =
1
|T |
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
t∈Ti
ut(s) (1)
Given a strategy profile s, we let s  Ti be the restriction of
s to Ti, that is, s  Ti is as s except it is only defined on the
arrival pairs in Ti. So s  Ti is the strategy profile for the
subgame in which only the arrival pairs in Ti can be chosen.
We can now rewrite formula (1) as
EU(s) =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
ut(s) =
1
|T |
∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
t∈Ti
ut(s  Ti) (2)
Note that there exists no t ∈ T1, t′ ∈ T2 and i ∈ {1, 2} such
that t ∼i t′. Hence the strategy profile s  T1 can be cho-
sen completely independently of the strategy profile s  T2.
Using formula (2) it then follows that a strategy profile s is
Pareto optimal in the full game if and only if each of the
strategy profiles s  T1 and s  T2 are Pareto optimal on
the subgames with arrival pairs only in T1 and T2, respec-
tively. When looking for Pareto optimal strategy profiles in
the game, we can hence look for Pareto optimal strategy pro-
files on each of the two subgames independently (essentially
the game consists of two disjoint subgames). Note also that
the two games are completely symmetric, since (t1, t2) ∈ T1 if
and only if (t2, t1) ∈ T2. Hence the two subgames necessarily
have the exactly the same strategy profiles up to symmetry
(swapping the roles of player 1 and 2). It is hence sufficient
to only investigate Pareto optimal strategies for one of these
subgames, say the subgame with arrival pairs in T1.
We will now try to determine the possible candidates for
being Pareto optimal strategy profiles for the subgame with
arrival pairs in T1. We do this by iteratively removing strategy
profiles that are not Pareto optimal.
Lemma 1. Going to the canteen at 9:00 or after can never
be part of a Pareto optimal strategy profile. More precisely:
No strategy profile s with si(ti) = c for some i ∈ {1, 2} and
ti ≥ 9:00 can be Pareto optimal.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile s with si(ti) = c for some
i ∈ {1, 2} and some t ∈ T1 with ti ≥ 9:00. We only consider
12
the case of i = 1, the case of i = 2 being proved similarly.
Then we have s1(t1) = c and t1 = 9:10 + 20x for some x
(recall that we have restricted attention to the arrival pairs
in T1). Now define a strategy profile s
′ which is identical to s
except s′j(t
′
j) = o for all j ∈ {1, 2} and t′j ≥ 9:00. We want to
show that s′ Pareto dominates s. First note that:
u(9:10+20x,9:00+20x)(s
′)= u(9:10+20x,9:00+20x)(o, o) def. of s
′
> u(9:10+20x,9:00+20x)(c, ·) by U2
= u(9:10+20x,9:00+20x)(s),
where the last equality follows from s1(9:10+20x) = s1(t1) =
c. This proves the existence of an arrival pair for which s′ has
a strictly higher utility than s. To prove EU(s′) > EU(s), we
hence only need to prove that ut′(s
′) ≥ ut′(s) for all t′ ∈ T1.
When t′1, t
′
2 < 9:00 this is trivial, as we then have s
′(t′) =
s(t′) by definition of s′. When t′j ≥ 9:00 for some j, s′(t′)
will by definition of s′ necessarily have an o in each position
where s(t′) also has one. It follows by constraint U2 that
ut′(s
′) ≥ ut′(s), as required.
Lemma 2. Assume si(t) = o and s3−i(t+ 10) = c for some
strategy profile s, some arrival time t, and some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then s is not Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let s, t and i be as stated above. We need to find a
strategy profile s′ Pareto dominating s. We only consider the
case i = 1, the case of i = 2 being symmetric. Then we have
s1(t) = o and s2(t+ 10) = c. If sj(t
′
j) = c for some j ∈ {1, 2}
and t′j ≥ 9:00, the existence of a strategy dominating s follows
immediately from Lemma 1. We can hence in the following
assume that sj(t
′
j) = o for all j ∈ {1, 2} and t′j ≥ 9:00. Since
s2(t+ 10) = c, we can thus also conclude that t+ 10 < 9:00.
Now define s′ to be identical to s except that we let
s′1(t− 20x) = c for x ≥ 0
s′2(t− 10− 20y) = c for y ≥ 0,
recalling that we are only considering arrival pairs in T1. We
want to show that EU(s′) > EU(s). First note that
u(t,t+10)(s
′)= u(t,t+10)(c, s2(t+ 10)) by def. of s
′
= u(t,t+10)(c, c) by def. of s
> u(t,t+10)(o, c) by U1, as t+ 10 < 9:00
= u(t,t+10)(s) by def. of s
To prove EU(s′) > EU(s), we hence only need to prove that
ut′(s
′) ≥ ut′(s) for all t′ ∈ T . The only non-trivial cases are
when either t′1 = t− 20x for some x ≥ 0 or t′2 = t− 10− 20y
for some y ≥ 0 (in all other cases, s′(t′) = s(t′)). Consider
first a t′ with t′2 = t − 10 − 20y for some y ≥ 0. Then
t′1 = t − 20x for some x ≥ 0, and hence ut′(s′) = ut′(c, c).
Constraint U1 now immediately gives ut′(c, c) ≥ ut′(s), and
hence ut′(s
′) ≥ ut′(s), as required. Consider instead t′ with
t′1 = t − 20x for some x ≥ 0. Then either t′2 = t − 10 − 20y
for some y ≥ 0 or we have t′1 = t and t′2 = t + 10. Both
cases have already previously been covered. This completes
the proof.
Definition 3. A cut-off strategy with cut-off t′ is a strategy
s with s(t) = c for all t < t′ and s(t) = o for all t > t′. A
cut-off strategy profile with cut-off t′ is a pair (s1, s2) where
both s1 and s2 are cut-off strategies with cut-off t
′. A cut-off
strategy (profile) with cut-off before 8:10 is called an all-office
strategy (profile).
Note that the strategy we in the informal discussions above
referred to as the “canteen-before-9” strategy is the cut-off
strategy with cut-off 8:55. We now get the result on optimal
strategies claimed in the informal discussion.
Theorem 4. Any Pareto optimal strategy profile is either
the all-office strategy profile or the cut-off strategy profile with
cut-off 8:55.
Proof. Let s be a Pareto optimal strategy profile. Assume
that tmin is of the form 8:50 − 20x for some x ≥ 0 and tmax
is of the form 9:00 + 20y for some y ≥ 0, the other cases be-
ing treated symmetrically. Let σ be the following string over
the alphabet {o, c}, where we alternate between the strategy
choices of player 1 and 2 from tmin to tmax:
s1(tmin)s2(tmin + 10)s1(tmin + 20)s2(tmin + 30) · · · s2(tmax)
Note that when (t1, t2) ∈ T1, then s1(t1) and s2(t2) both
occur in the string σ. From Lemma 2 it follows that σ cannot
contain the substring oc. Suppose the first letter of σ is o.
Then since σ does not contain the substring oc, we have σ =
o|σ| (a string of only os). Hence s1(t) = s2(t) = o for all
t ∈ T1. This means that s is the all-office strategy profile.
Suppose alternatively that the first letter of σ is c. The last
letter of σ is necessarily o since tmax ≥ 9:00 and s is Pareto
optimal, cf. Lemma 1. Since σ is then a string that starts
with c and ends with o, but doesn’t contain oc, it must have
the form cnom for some n,m ≥ 1 with m + n = |σ|. Hence
there exists a t′ such that si(t) = c for all t < t′ and si(t) = o
for all t > t′ (and all i ∈ {1, 2}). In other words, s is a cut-
off strategy profile with cut-off t′. What is left to prove is
then only that s has cut-off 8:55. First note that we must
necessarily have t′ < 9:00, since otherwise s would not be
Pareto optimal according to Lemma 1. From this it follows
that we for all arrival pairs (t1, t2) ∈ T1 must have
1. If t1, t2 < t
′, the two players coordinate into the can-
teen, receiving the highest possible payoff.
2. If t1 < t
′ < t2 or t2 < t′ < t1, the two players are
miscoordinated (one chooses canteen, the other office),
receiving the lowest possible payoff.
3. If t1, t2 > t
′, the two players coordinate into their of-
fices, receiving a payoff strictly between the lowest and
highest.
Note that there will always be exactly one arrival pair in T1
of type 2, independent of t′. Since arrival pairs of type 1 have
a higher payoff than arrival pairs of type 3, and s is Pareto
optimal, s must have the maximal number of arrival pairs of
type 1, that is, it is the cut-off strategy with the latest possible
cut-off. That is exactly the cut-off 8:55 (or, more precisely,
any cut-off strictly between 8:50 and 9:00).
The theorem proves what was argued in the main text:
There are only two candidates for an optimal strategy, the
all-office strategy or the canteen-before-9 strategy. This does
not in any way imply that we should expect human players to
adopt any of these two strategies, but if two perfectly rational
players were to play the game, and if they knew they could
expect the other player to play perfectly rational as well, of
course the optimal strategy would be played. And, as earlier
mentioned, in our particular version of the game, the optimal
strategy is the all-office strategy.
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Logistic regression
The experimental results were analyzed using a logistic regres-
sion model with the arrival time t as predictor. The model
was specified as µi = αi + βit, with µi being the log-odds
µi = log(pi/(1 − pi)) and i = 1, 2, 3 denoting the MTurk,
DTU1 and DTU2 experiments, respectively, allowing for dif-
fering slopes and intercepts. Results are shown in Figure 1.
The steepest slope occurs at p(t) = 1/2 = −α/β, which for the
MTurk and DTU1 experiments is t = 8:48 and for DTU2 is
t = 8:52. The regression line in Figure 5 is obtained similarly
by combining observations from all three experiments. The
high number of observations imply small confidence bands.
Hence, conclusions from the models can be viewed as robust.
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Supplementary Information
MTurk Walkthrough and Screenshots
After accepting our ‘Human Intelligence Task’ (HIT) and providing informed consent, participants from MTurk were
put in a ’waiting room’ until they were paired up with another participant. After a group of two was formed,
participants were directed to an initial instruction page which detailed the rules of the game with a time limit of 240
seconds, see screenshot in Fig. 7.
After reading the instructions, participants were directed to round 1 (of 10) where they were given their own arrival
time and asked to make a decision between between going to the canteen or the office. Each round had a time limit
of 61 seconds and rules from the instructions were repeated on the bottom of the page, see example screenshots for
round 1 (Fig. 8).
After making their decision (‘Canteen’ or ‘Office’), participants were asked to estimate how certain they were that
the other player made the same choice as them, ranging from ‘very uncertain’ over ‘slightly certain’, ‘somewhat
certain’ and ‘quite certain’ to ‘very certain’, see Fig. 9.
After both players have made their choices and their certainty estimates, they are prompted to a results page
showing them the results of the previous rounds, including arrival times for both players, their choices, their own
certainty estimate and resulting payoff, see example screenshot after round 6 (Fig. 10). After 30 seconds, the game
would automatically proceed to the next round.
In many instances, groups were not able to play the maximal number of rounds, because one or both of the
participants had lost all their bonuses. An example of such a situation is shown in Fig. 11. In such cases, the game
would end for both players and they were asked to answer a follow-up question:
1. “The game is over. Do you think it was your fault it is over, your colleagues fault, or do you think it
was because of some other reason?” (Possible answers: ‘My fault’, ‘Other’s fault’, ‘Other reason’)
This question probes into participants’ ability to rise above their possibly myopic understanding of the game.
In addition to this question, all participants were asked three additional post-game questions about their strategy
of play and their understanding of the game. The first was:
2. “What strategy did you use while playing this game?” (open ended)
The answers to this question provided insight into the reasoning and thoughts of the participants. The next question
was used to gauge the depths of recursive reasoning and reads:
3. “Imagine you could have agreed beforehand with your colleague about a point in time where it is safe
to go to the canteen. What time would that be?” (‘I don’t know’, ‘There is no such time’, 8:00, 8:10,
8:20, 8:30, 8:40, 8:50, 9:00, 9:10)
A final question pertaining all participant’s understanding of the concept of common knowledge was the following:
4. “Imagine you arrive at 8:10 am. Is it common knowledge between you and your colleague that it is safe
to go to the canteen, that is, you both arrived before 9:00 am?”. (‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’)
DTU Experiments
The DTU students were asked three additional post-game questions:
5. “Did you ever go to the canteen at an arrival time later than what was safe according to your previous
answer? Why or why not?” (open ended)
6. ‘Did you ever choose differently after seeing the same arrival time again at a later point in the game?
Why or why not?” (open ended)
7. ‘Imagine you arrived at [8:40/9:00] and you have been secretly informed that your colleague’s arrival
time is 8:50. Where do you think your colleague will go?” (‘Canteen’, ‘Office’)
In the last question, half of the participants were given 8:40 as their own arrival time while the other half were given
9:00. The question concerns whether player’s own knowledge of the other’s arrival time affect their prediction of the
other player’s decision. It relates to the curse of knowledge [1] since participants might attribute their own belief
(that it is early enough or too late to go to the canteen) to the other player.
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MTurk Settings
Looking at Table II, the average payout to MTurk-workers was $4.17 (including a general participation fee of $2) which
amounts to an average of more than $20 per hour, which is considered very generous according to MTurk guidelines
and certainly above the recently estimated average of $6 per hour when excluding un-submitted and rejected work
[2]. Students in the DTU experiments (DTU1 and DTU2) did not receive any monetary reward, but were told to try
to maximize their payoff, and awarded prizes for doing well.
Experiment Participants Attrition rate N Rounds AvgPayout ($)
MTurk 714 0.02 680 10 4.36
DTU1 106 0.13 80 30 (prizes)
DTU2 50 0.08 42 30 -
TABLE II: The main experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) had 714 participants of which 17 participants (2,4 %)
quit prematurely, some of them quite early in the game. These quitters were told (in the consent form) that they would receive
no bonus and no participantion fee. They are excluded from the data analysis. Their “lucky” colleagues however, got both
their bonuses and participation fee, but are likewise excluded from the data analysis. Therefore the final number of subjects,
N , is reduced by twice the attrition rate. In the two DTU experiments with students from the Technical University of Denmark
(DTU1 and DTU2) attrition rates were slightly higher, mainly due to the higher number of rounds played.
Participants quitting a study before completing it is prevalent on MTurk, and varies systemically across experimental
conditions [3]. In our experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk attrition rates were 2 %, witnessing that we had
managed to design the experiment in a way that minimized drop-out rates. A combination of high payouts, a
logarithmic scoring rule taking advantage of loss aversion biases, a consent form stipulating the revocation of the
participation fee after dropout, and minimization of waiting times may have been the main reasons.
All participants automatically received a ‘qualification’ when accepting a HIT. This qualification ensured that
participants could not play the game again. In addition, we required that participants should have had completed at
least 500 HITs, have an accepted HIT rate of 98% or above, and should be from the United States or Canada. This
ensured that we would get relatively experienced and qualified participants.
MTurk participant attention was expected to be equal to or better than undergraduate participant’s attention [4],
while various forms of dishonesty (practical joking or trying to pair up with a friend) was expected to be rare, due
to the high turnover rate experienced for our HITs. In addition, during the experiment, participants had easy access
to our email for questions and possible bug reports. Apart from a few timeouts, participants had no comments or
complaints.
Formal definitions of Private, Shared and Common Knowledge
We can define the notion of common knowledge and related notions a bit more precisely as follows, following the
conventions from epistemic logic (see e.g. Herzig and Mauffre [5]). Given a proposition p and an agent i, we use Kip
to denote that agent i knows p. Given a group of agents G = {1, . . . ,m}, we say that p is private knowledge in G
if at least one of the agents know p, that is, if Kip is true for some i ∈ G. We use EGp to denote that everybody
in G knows p, that is, for all i ∈ G, it is true that Kip. Whenever it is not necessary to be explicit about the group
of agents G, we will just write Ep and say “everybody knows p”. For all n, we then recursively define Enp to be
shorthand for EEn−1p, where E1p is shorthand for Ep. So for instance E2p expresses that “everybody knows that
everybody knows that p”, and in general Enp means we have n iterations of “everybody knows that” in front of p.
We read Enp as “everybody knows p to depth/order n”. We also call this shared knowledge (of p) to depth/order
n, or nth-order shared knowledge. When we say that p is shared knowledge, we mean that it is shared knowledge to
depth n for some n ≥ 1. Common knowledge of p then means that Enp is true for all n ∈ N.
In epistemic logic, the three notions—private, shared and common knowledge—are usually not considered to be
mutually exclusive. So if p is common knowledge, it is also automatically both shared and private, since when
the conditions for p being common knowledge are satisfied, also the conditions for it being shared and private are
satisfied. However, in many cases, as in our paper, we want to make an exclusive distinction between the three types
of knowledge. We can define p to be shared knowledge only if it is shared knowledge but not common knowledge.
Thus, p is shared knowledge only if for some n we have Enp but not En+1p. Similarly, we can say that p is private
knowledge only if p is private but not shared knowledge. Thus, p is private knowledge only if Kip holds for some, but
not all, i. In most texts, as in ours, it is left implicit whether private and shared knowledge are interpreted inclusive
or exclusive, that is, one doesn’t explicitly distinguish between “shared knowledge” and “shared knowledge only”.
Normally it is clear from the context whether one intends the concept to be interpreted exclusively or inclusively.
In our paper, we interpret the concepts exclusively, although we make an exception for private knowledge. When
p is known by all agents, we say that p is both private and (first-order) shared knowledge. The exact border between
private and shared knowledge vary significantly between different papers. De Freitas [6] consider the case Ep to still
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only be private knowledge, and for p to be considered shared knowledge furthermore requires that there is at least
one agent i knowing Ep to be true (that is, requires KiEp to be true for some i ∈ G). The point of De Freitas et al.
is that if only Ep is true, it is not really shared knowledge, but only private knowledge held by everyone in G. In our
paper, we have sought a compromise between the terminology by De Freitas et al. and the standard terminology in
epistemic logic, and hence we have the overlap between private and shared knowledge.
Supporting data analysis
When a group experiences a round of miscoordination, we expect some kind of learning to take place. ‘Why did
my colleague choose differently than I did?’ should be an obvious question a player asks herself, prompting deeper
perspective-taking and possibly an understanding of the lack of common knowledge. We investigate this by partitioning
decisions into those in which a participant never before has experienced a miscoodination with her colleague (m = 0)
and those in which a participant has experienced one or more miscoodinations (m > 0). Furthermore, since the
number of rounds - and hence miscoordinations - are very different for MTurk participants and DTU students, results
from MTurk and DTU are shown separately, with the two DTU experiments combined. Results for the choices in
Figure 12 show significant differences between MTurk-groups having miscoordinated or not, while for DTU students
those differences are not significant. Looking into the corresponding certainty estimates, as shown in Figure 13, we
see a similar pattern as before: Much steeper profiles among DTU students, but also much lower certainty estimates
around critical arrival times.
Datasets
MTurk anonymous.xlsx, DTU1 anonymous.xlsx, and DTU2 anonymous.xlsx: Anonymized data set of all Mechanical
Turk experiments. Parameters: session = name of experiment; code = anonymized participant id; group = group
number in session; id in group = player id in group; round = round number; arrival = arrival time; choice = choice
made by participant; certainty = certainty estimate by participant; bonus = penalty in dollars; strategy = free text
question after game has ended; simple = answers to question 4, cutoff = answers to question 3; fault = answers to
question 1; payoff = money left after game has finished.
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FIG. 7: Screenshot of instructions page.
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FIG. 8: Screenshot of choice page, round 1.
FIG. 9: Screenshot of page where participants had to estimate the probability that their colleague would make the same choice.
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FIG. 10: Screenshot of results page, round 6.
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FIG. 11: Screenshot after a player has lost all her bonus.
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(b)
FIG. 12: Participant’s decisions of going to the canteen as a function of their arrival time, here partitioned into those groups
who previous have experienced zero (blue) or one or more (orange) miscoordinations. MTurk participants are shown one the
left, DTU students on the right
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FIG. 13: Participant’s certainty estimates of being able to coordinate with their colleauge as a function of their arrival time,
partitioned into those groups who previous have experienced zero (blue) or one or more (orange) miscoordinations. MTurk
participants are shown one the left, DTU students on the right
